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Federalism and International Law Through 
the Lens of Legal Pluralism 
Paul Schiff Berman* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Federalism in the United States is often discussed in terms of sovereign-
ty.  Thus, we are told that the colonies were originally completely separate 
sovereign entities and that though they ceded some authority to the federal 
government, they retained their sovereign prerogatives.  Accordingly, so the 
story goes, we live in a system of 51 sovereignties, and discussions of      
federalism are about how best to negotiate the relative power of these differ-
ent sovereign entities.1 
This, however, is not the only way of thinking about federalism.  Indeed, 
there is a different story we could tell, perhaps best captured in the oft-quoted 
idea of the states as “laboratories” of democracy.2  Here the federal system is 
important not so much because such a system maintains the autonomy of 
different sovereign entities, but because it provides the opportunity for mul-
tiple decision-makers to try out different solutions to similar problems.  
Moreover, the dialogue among the multiple decisionmakers may cause better 
solutions to spread through the system or may cause decisionmakers to rec-
ognize that varying solutions may be appropriate given varying local condi-
tions.  From this perspective, the overlapping jurisdiction of federal and state 
  
 * Dean and Foundation Professor, Arizona State University Sandra Day 
O’Connor College of Law.  This Essay is based on remarks delivered during a sym-
posium, “Return to Missouri v. Holland: Federalism and International Law,” held at 
the University of Missouri School of Law, in February 2008.  My thanks to Robert 
Ahdieh, Janet Koven Levit, Peggy McGuinness, and Judith Resnik for helpful com-
ments on earlier iterations.  
 1.  See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), for an example of this 
conceptual framework.  
 2. See, e.g., New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Bran-
deis, J., dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a sin-
gle courageous State may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel 
social and economic experiments without risk to  the rest of  the country.”);  see also, 
e.g., Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 344 (1921) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (“There is 
nothing that I more deprecate than the use of the Fourteenth Amendment beyond the 
absolute compulsion of its words to prevent the making of social experiments that an 
important part of the community desires . . . even though the experiments may seem 
futile or even noxious  to me  .  .  .  .”).   This narrative about  federalism has been  less 
prominent since the New Deal.  See, e.g., Richard C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store 
Movement, Localist Ideology, and the Remnants of the Progressive Constitution, 
1920-1940, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1011 (2005) (discussing decline of localism following 
the New Deal).    
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entities is seen as opening the possibility for creative innovation.  This is what 
might be called a pluralist justification for federalism.   
As with federalism, the relationship between international law and na-
tion-state law similarly is often viewed through the lens of sovereignty.  And 
again, as with federalism, the sovereigntist approach focuses on states as au-
tonomous power centers.  Thus, according to the conventional narrative, 
states use international law when it is in their interests, but ignore it when it is 
not.  In this vision, international law is merely an epiphenomenon of state 
sovereignty, not any limitation upon it.3 
But, again as with federalism, we can view international law through a 
pluralist lens.  Thus, we may focus on international and transnational legal 
pronouncements as providing alternative sources of authority that can change 
legal consciousness over time, affect local debates, empower different local 
actors, and provide an alternative set of fora in which individuals and coali-
tions can make their voices heard.4  On this view, rational choice understand-
ings of how international law works or pure theory debates about sovereignty 
are limited because they focus too heavily on coercive power, thereby giving 
insufficient attention to the role of rhetorical persuasion, informal articula-
tions of legal norms, and networks of affiliation that may not possess literal 
enforcement power.  All of these are emphasized in a pluralist frame. 
Recently, a group of scholars, many influenced by the seminal work of 
Robert Cover,5 have embraced a more pluralist approach to both American 
federalism and international law.6  They have touted the important virtues of 
jurisdictional redundancy and inter-systemic governance models in which 
  
 3. See, e.g., JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF 
INTERNATIONAL LAW (2005).  For one (among many) published critiques of this ap-
proach to international law, see Paul Schiff Berman, Seeing Beyond the Limits of 
International Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1265 (2006) (book review).  
 4. See Berman, supra note 3, at 1295-96. 
 5. See Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Ide-
ology, and Innovation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 639 (1981).  
 6. See, e.g., Robert B. Ahdieh, Between Dialogue and Decree: International 
Review of National Courts, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2029 (2004); Robert B. Ahdieh, Di-
alectical Regulation, 38 CONN. L. REV. 863 (2006) [hereinafter Ahdieh, Dialectical 
Regulation]; Paul Schiff Berman, Global Legal Pluralism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 1155 
(2007); Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570 
(1996); Hari M. Osofsky & Janet Koven Levit, The Scale of Networks?: Local Cli-
mate Change Coalitions, 8 CHI. J. INT’L L. 409 (2008); Judith Resnik, Afterword: 
Federalism’s Options, 14 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 465, 473 (1996) [hereinafter Resnik, 
Afterword]; Judith Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs: Rethinking Horizontal Fede-
ralism and Foreign Affairs Preemption in Light of Translocal Internationalism, 57 
EMORY L.J. 31 (2007) [hereinafter Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs]; Judith Res-
nik, Law’s Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism’s 
Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006) [hereinafter Resnik, Law’s Migra-
tion]; Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. 
REV. 243 (2005). 
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multiple legal and regulatory authorities weigh in regarding the same acts and 
actors.  And, like Cover, they argue that such jurisdictional redundancies are 
not just a necessary accommodation to the reality of a world of multiple au-
thority; they may actually be beneficial.  In short, we can view legal pluralism 
(to use the parlance of computer science) as a feature and not a bug. 
This is a controversial move.  After all, it is one thing to recognize the 
inevitability of legal pluralism as a description of reality and quite another to 
treat it as normatively desirable.  Indeed, legal pluralists have historically 
focused primarily on the descriptive, tracing the overlaps and tensions that 
occur when two or more legal or quasi-legal systems operate in the same so-
cial field.7  Thus, anthropologists have charted the relationships between co-
lonial and indigenous legal systems,8 theorists of religious pluralism have 
documented the interactions between state law and religious communities,9 
  
 7. See, e.g., Sally Falk Moore, Legal Systems of the World: An Introductory 
Guide to Classifications, Typological Interpretations, and Bibliographical Resources, 
in LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 11, 15 (Leon Lipson & Stanton Wheeler eds., 
1986) (“[N]ot all the phenomena related to law and not all that are lawlike have their 
source in government.”).  For further discussions of legal pluralism, see BOAVENTURA 
DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE (2d ed. 2002); LAW AND 
GLOBALIZATION FROM  BELOW: TOWARDS A COSMOPOLITAN LEGALITY (Boaventura 
de Sousa Santos & César A. Rodríguez-Garavito eds., 2005); Gunther Teubner, 
‘Global Bukowina’: Legal Pluralism in the World Society, in GLOBAL LAW WITHOUT 
A STATE 3 (Gunther Teubner ed., 1997); KEEBET VON BENDA-BECKMANN,  
TRANSNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF LEGAL PLURALISM (2001); CAROL WEISBROD, 
EMBLEMS OF PLURALISM: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES AND THE STATE (2002); Berman, 
supra note 6; Paul Schiff Berman, A Pluralist Approach to International Law, 32 
YALE J. INT’L L. 301 (2007); David M. Engel, Legal Pluralism in an American Com-
munity: Perspectives on a Civil Trial Court, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 425; Marc 
Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private Ordering, and Indigenous Law, 19 
J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1, 28-34 (1981); John Griffiths, What Is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. 
LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1 (1986); Sally Engle Merry, International Law 
and Sociolegal Scholarship: Toward a Spatial Global Legal Pluralism, 41 STUD. L. 
POL. & SOC’Y 149 (2008) [hereinafter Merry, Spatial Global Legal Pluralism]; Sally 
Engle Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 869, 870 (1988) [hereinafter 
Merry, Legal Pluralism]; Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-
Autonomous Social F ield as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 
719 (1973) [hereinafter Moore, The Semi-Autonomous Social F ield]; Balakrishnan 
Rajagopal, The Role of Law in Counter-hegemonic Globalization and Global Legal 
Pluralism: Lessons from the Narmada Valley Struggle in India, 18 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 
345 (2005); Brian Z. Tamanaha, A Non-Essentialist Version of Legal Pluralism, 27 J.L. 
& SOC’Y 296 (2000); Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?, 
47 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 37 (2002). 
 8. For a review of the literature, see Merry, Legal Pluralism, supra note 7. 
 9. See, e.g., CAROL WEISBROD, THE BOUNDARIES OF UTOPIA (1980) (examining 
the contractual underpinnings of four Nineteenth-Century American religious utopian 
communities: the Shakers, the Harmony Society, Oneida, and Zoar).  As Marc Galan-
ter has observed, the field of church and state is the “locus classicus of thinking about 
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and so on.  These scholars have persuasively argued that all legal systems are 
inevitably plural.  And while such an argument depends in part on how broad 
one’s definition of  law is,10 there can be little dispute that legal pluralism is 
often an accurate description of the world we live in. 
But what about the next step: that legal pluralism is actually a desirable 
aspect of a legal system, one with distinct benefits?  After all, Cover’s article, 
The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy, aimed not simply to describe Ameri-
can federalism, but to justify it.11  Indeed, Cover celebrated the benefits that 
accrue from having multiple overlapping jurisdictional assertions (by both 
state and non-state entities).12  Such benefits include a greater possibility for 
error correction, a more robust field for norm articulation, and a larger space 
for creative innovation.13  Moreover, we might think that when decisionmak-
ers are forced to consider the existence of other possible decisionmakers they 
will tend to adopt, over time, a more restrained view of their own “jurispath-
ic”  power.14  Instead, they may come to see themselves as part of a larger 
tapestry of decisionmaking in which they are not the only potentially relevant 
voice.  Finally, though Cover acknowledged that  it might seem perverse “to 
seek out a messy and indeterminate end to conflicts which may be tied neatly 
together  by  a  single  authoritative  verdict,”  he  nevertheless  argued  that  we 
should  “embrace”  a  system  “that  permits  .  .  .  tensions  and  conflicts of the 
social order”  to be played out  in  the  jurisdictional structure of  the system.15  
Thus, Cover’s pluralism, though focused on U.S. federalism, can be expanded 
to include the creative possibilities inherent in multiple overlapping jurisdic-
tions asserted by both state and non-state entities in whatever context they 
arise.   More recently, Judith Resnik has touted the “multiple ports of entry” 
that a federalist system creates16 and has argued that what constitutes the ap-
propriate  spheres  for  “local,”  “national,”  and  “international”  regulation and 
adjudication changes over time and should not be essentialized.17  A pluralist 
approach resolutely refuses such sovereigntist essentialization. 
  
the multiplicity of normative orders.”   Galanter, supra note 7, at 28; see also Carol 
Weisbrod, Family, Church and State: An Essay on Constitutionalism and Rel igious 
Authority, 26 J. FAM. L. 741 (1987-88) (analyzing church-state relations in the United 
States from a pluralist perspective). 
 10. Brian Z. Tamanaha, The  Folly  of  the  ‘Social  Scientific’  Concept  of  Legal 
Pluralism, 20 J.L. & SOC’Y 192, 193 (1993). 
 11. Cover, supra note 5, at 641-43.  
 12. Id. at 682. 
 13. Cover, supra note 5. 
 14. See id. at 664-68 (describing the idea that judges are inevitably jurispathic 
because in making a decision they “kill” competing legal visions). 
 15. Id. at 682.  
 16. See Resnik, Law’s Migration, supra note 6.  
 17. See Resnik, Afterword, supra note 6, at 473-74 (“My point  is not only  that 
particular subject matter may go back and forth between state and federal governance 
but also that the tradition of allocation itself is one constantly being reworked; period-
ically, events prompt the revisiting of state or federal authority, and the lines move.”).  
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In this brief Essay, then, I wish to engage in a thought experiment by 
looking at both federalism and international law through a pluralist rather 
than a sovereigntist lens.  First, I summarize the pluralist literature and some 
of its core insights and suggest that scholars interested in international law 
(and its relationship with domestic law) would do well to consider this litera-
ture.  Second, I provide a few examples of jurisdictional redundancy operat-
ing in the transnational, international, and federalist realm and show how the 
existence of multiple fora can both empower voices that might otherwise be 
silenced and effect changes of legal consciousness over time.  Finally, I turn 
to a recent controversy concerning the relationship between federalism and 
international law, Medellín v. Texas,18 in which the United States Supreme 
Court intervened in a dispute among the International Court of Justice, the 
Bush administration, and the State of Texas regarding the appropriate role of 
the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations19 in a state capital murder case.  
Although the Supreme Court majority emphasized the need to delineate clear, 
non-overlapping spheres of international, national, and state authority, I draw 
on the insights of legal pluralism to proffer a more flexible approach to the 
interaction of multiple sources of law implicated by the case.  
  
 18. 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).  
 19. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations and Optional Protocol on Dis-
putes, Apr. 24, 1963, 21 U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations]. 
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II.  LEGAL PLURALISM AND THE GLOBAL LEGAL ORDER 
As I have argued elsewhere,20 scholars seeking to understand the multi-
faceted role of law in an era of globalization21 must take seriously the insights 
  
 20. See Berman, supra note 6; Berman, supra note 7. 
 21. Of course, the idea of an “era of globalization” is contested.  Indeed, the vast 
debates  concerning  globalization’s  meaning,  its  importance,  and  even  its  existence 
could fill many volumes.  For purposes of this Essay, I do not attempt to articulate a 
single definition because part of the premise of law and globalization is that multiple 
definitions and meanings for globalization will be salient for different populations.  
See, e.g., SANTOS, supra note 7, at 178 (“There is strictly no single entity called glo-
balization.  There are, rather, globalizations, and we should always use the term only 
in the plural.”).  Thus, I use the term to refer generally to the intensification of global 
interconnectedness, in which capital, people, commodities, images, and ideologies 
move across distance and physical boundaries with increasing speed and frequency.  
See, e.g., ANTHONY GIDDENS, RUNAWAY WORLD: HOW GLOBALIZATION IS 
RESHAPING OUR LIVES 24-37 (2000) (pointing to the increased level of trade, finance, 
and capital flows, and describing the effects of the weakening hold of older nation-
states).  Indeed, I am content to acknowledge that the existence of many different 
visions of globalization is a fundamental part of globalization itself. 
  Even some who acknowledge globalization nevertheless question whether 
globalization is really a new phenomenon at all.  Certainly, interrelations among mul-
tiple populations across territorial boundaries have existed for centuries.  For       
example, some argue that the pre-1914 era was in fact the high-water mark for eco-
nomic interdependence, although there is also evidence that the post-1989 era      
surpasses that period.  See Miles Kahler & David A. Lake, Globalization and Gover-
nance, in GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY:  POLITICAL AUTHORITY IN 
TRANSITION 1, 10-14 (Miles Kahler & David A. Lake eds., 2003).  Again I do not 
think such arguments need detain us.  First, it seems clear that something is going on, 
given the pervasiveness of the ideology of market capitalism, the speed of commodi-
ty, capital, and personal movement, the ubiquity of global media, and so on.  Whether 
such developments are truly new (or greater than ever before) seems less important 
than understanding the consequences of the phenomena.  Second, I see the term “glo-
balization”  as  also  signifying the attitude about the world that tends to come into 
being as a result of frequent use of the term itself.  Indeed, in a certain sense it does 
not really matter whether, as an empirical matter, the world is more or  less “globa-
lized”  than  it used  to be.   More  important  is  the  fact  that people  – whether govern-
mental actors, corporations, scholars, or general citizens – think and act as if the 
world is more interconnected and treat globalization as a real phenomenon.  In addi-
tion, there is at least some evidence that global “scripts” are exerting a broad impact, 
at least in the officially sanctioned discourse of governmental bureaucrats.  See, e.g., 
John W. Meyer et al., World Society and the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. SOC. 144, 145 
(1997)  (“Worldwide models define and  legitimate agendas  for  local  action,  shaping 
the structures and policies of nation-states and other national and local actors in vir-
tually all of the domains of rationalized social life . .  . .”).   For further discussion of 
“the problematics of globalization,” see Paul Schiff Berman,  From International Law 
to Law and Globalization, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 485, 551-55 (2005). 
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of legal pluralism.  In general, theorists of pluralism start from the premise 
that people belong to (or feel affiliated with) multiple groups and understand 
themselves to be bound by the norms of these multiple groups.22  Such groups 
can, of course, include familiar political affiliations, such as nation-states, 
states within a federation, counties, towns, and so on.  But many community 
affiliations, such as those held by transnational or subnational ethnic groups, 
religious institutions, trade organizations, unions, internet chat groups, and a 
myriad of other “norm-generating communities”23 may at various times exert 
tremendous power over our actions even though they are not part of an “offi-
cial”  state-based system.  Indeed, as scholars of legal pluralism have long 
noted, “not all the phenomena related to law and not all that are lawlike have 
their source in government.”24   
Just as importantly, legal pluralists have studied those situations in 
which two or more state and non-state normative systems occupy the same 
social field and must negotiate the resulting hybrid legal space.  Historically, 
anthropologically-oriented legal pluralists focused on the overlapping norma-
tive systems created during the process of colonization.25  For example, early 
Twentieth-Century studies of indigenous law among tribes and villages in 
colonized societies noted the simultaneous existence of both local law and 
European law.26  Indeed, British colonial law actually incorporated Hindu, 
Muslim, and Christian personal law into its administrative framework.27  This 
early pluralist scholarship focused on the hierarchical coexistence of what 
were imagined to be quite separate legal systems, layered one on top of the 
other.  Despite the somewhat reductionist model, these pioneering studies 
established the key insights of legal pluralism: a recognition that multiple 
normative orders exist, a focus on the dialectical interaction between and 
among these normative orders, and an identification of the ways in which 
  
 22. See, e.g., AVIGAIL I. EISENBERG, RECONSTRUCTING POLITICAL PLURALISM 2 
(1995)  (“[Pluralist  theories] seek  to organize and conceptualize political phenomena 
on the basis of the plurality of groups to which individuals belong and by which indi-
viduals seek to advance and, more importantly, to develop, their interests.”). 
 23. Robert M. Cover, Foreword, Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 43 
(1983). 
 24. Sally Falk Moore, Legal Systems of the World: An Introductory Guide to 
Classifications, Typological Interpretations, and Bibliographical Resources, in LAW 
AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 7, at 12, 15; see also Gunther Teubner, The 
Two Faces of Janus: Rethinking Legal Pluralism, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1443, 1443 
(1992) (“[L]egal pluralism is at the same time both: social norms and legal rules, law 
and society, formal and informal, rule-oriented and spontaneous.”).    But see        
Tamanaha, supra note 10, at 193 (arguing that such a broad view of “law” causes law 
to lose any distinctive meaning). 
 25. See Merry, Legal Pluralism, supra note 7, at 869-72 (summarizing the litera-
ture).   
 26. See, e.g., BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, CRIME AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY 
(1926).  
 27. Merry, Spatial Global Legal Pluralism, supra note 7, at 156.   
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actors strategically use the existence of multiple fora to pursue their agen-
das.28 
In the 1970s and 1980s, anthropological scholars of pluralism compli-
cated the picture in two significant ways.  First, they questioned the hierar-
chical model of one legal system simply dominating the other and instead 
argued that plural systems are often only semi-autonomous, operating within 
the framework of other legal fields, but not entirely governed by them.29  As 
Sally Engle Merry recounts, this was an extraordinarily powerful conceptual 
move  because  it  placed  “at  the  center  of  investigation the relationship be-
tween the official legal system and other forms of ordering that connect with 
but are in some ways separate from and dependent on it.”30  Second, scholars 
began to conceptualize the interaction between legal systems as bi-
directional, with each influencing (and helping to constitute) the other.31  And 
though these studies continued to focus on less official forms of legal and 
quasi-legal regulation, this recognition of jurisdictional overlaps among   
multiple normative systems and the inevitable strategic interaction among 
them provides a useful template for studying both international law and    
federalism. 
Those who study international public and private law have not, histori-
cally, paid much attention to legal pluralism, likely because the emphasis 
traditionally has been on state-to-state relations.  However, the rise of a con-
ception of international human rights in the post-World War II era trans-
formed individuals into international law stakeholders, possessing their own 
entitlements against the state.32  But even apart from individual empower-
ment, scholars have more recently come to recognize the myriad ways in 
which the prerogatives of nation-states are cabined by transnational and inter-
national actors.  Whereas F.A. Mann could confidently state in 1984 that 
“laws extend so far as, but no further than the sovereignty of the State which 
  
 28. See Merry, Legal Pluralism, supra note 7, at 873. 
 29. See, e.g., Robert L. Kidder, Toward an Integrated Theory of Imposed Law, in 
THE IMPOSITION OF LAW 289 (Sandra B. Burman & Barbara E. Harrell-Bond eds., 
1979); Moore, The Semi-Autonomous Social F ield, supra note 7. 
 30. Merry, Legal Pluralism, supra note 7, at 873. 
 31. See, e.g., Peter Fitzpatrick, Law and Societies, 22 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 115 
(1984).  
 32. See, e.g., W. Michael Reisman, Introduction to JURISDICTION IN 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, at xi, xii  (W. Michael Reisman ed., 1999)  (noting  that “since 
the Second World War, an increasing number of international norms of both customa-
ry and conventional provenance . . . now restrict or displace specific law-making and 
applying competences of states”); Louis Henkin, Human Rights and State “Sovereign-
ty,” Sibley Lecture  (Mar.  1994),  in 25 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 31, 33 (1996)  (“At 
mid-century, the international system began a slow, hesitant move from state values 
towards  human  values.”).    But see MARK W. JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 5-6 (4th ed. 2003); 1 GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 34-36 (3d ed. 1957) (both noting that even after Nuremberg, 
international law derived primarily from state practice). 
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puts  them into  force,”33 many international law scholars have, at least since 
the end of the Cold War, argued that such a narrow view of how law operates 
transnationally is inadequate.  Thus, the past fifteen years have seen increas-
ing attention to the important – though sometimes inchoate – processes of 
international norm development.34  Such processes inevitably lead scholars to 
consider overlapping transnational jurisdictional assertions by nation-states, 
as well as norms articulated by international bodies, non-governmental organ-
izations (NGOs), multinational corporations and industry groups, indigenous 
communities, transnational terrorists, networks of activists, and so on. 
Yet, while international law scholars are increasingly emphasizing the 
importance of these overlapping legal and quasi-legal communities, there has 
been surprisingly little attention paid to the pluralism literature.35  This is a 
shame because this literature could help international law find a more com-
prehensive framework for conceptualizing the clash of normative communi-
ties in the modern world.  Consider, for example, Sally Falk Moore’s idea of 
the “semiautonomous social field,” which she describes as one that 
can generate rules and customs and symbols internally, but that . . . 
is also vulnerable to rules and decisions and other forces emanating 
from the larger world by which it is surrounded.  The semi-
autonomous social field has rule-making capacities, and the means 
to induce or coerce compliance; but it is simultaneously set in a 
larger social matrix which can, and does, affect and invade it, 
sometimes at the invitation of persons inside it, sometimes at its 
own instance.36 
Notice that,  following Moore’s  idea, we  can  conceive  of  a  legal  system  as 
both autonomous and permeable; outside norms affect the system, but do not 
dominate it fully.  The framework thus captures a dialectical and iterative 
interplay that we see among normative communities in the international sys-
tem – an interplay that rigidly territorialist or positivist visions of legal au-
thority do not address. 
In addition, pluralism offers possibilities for thinking about spaces of re-
sistance to state law.  Indeed, by recognizing at least the semi-autonomy of 
conflicting legal orders, pluralism necessarily examines limits to the ideologi-
cal power of state legal pronouncements.  Pluralists do not deny the signific-
ance of state law and coercive power, of course, but they do try to identify 
  
 33. F. A. Mann, The Doctrine of International Jurisdiction Revisited After Twen-
ty Years, 186 RECUEIL DES COURS 9, 20 (1984). 
 34. See Berman, supra note 21, at 488-89 (summarizing some of this literature). 
 35. There are some exceptions.  See, e.g., William W. Burke-White, Internation-
al Legal Pluralism, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 963 (2004); Benedict Kingsbury, Editorial 
Comments, Confronting Difference:  The Puzzling Durability  of Gentili’s Combina-
tion of Pragmatic Pluralism and Normative Judgment, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 713 (1998).  
 36. Moore, The Semi-Autonomous Social F ield, supra note 7, at 720. 
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places where state law does not penetrate or penetrates only partially, and 
where alternative forms of ordering persist to provide opportunities for resis-
tance, contestation, and alternative vision.  Such an approach encourages 
international law scholars to treat the multiple sites of normative authority in 
the global legal system as a set of inevitable interactions to be managed, not 
as  a  “problem”  to  be  “solved.”    And  again,  though  pluralists  historically 
looked only at non-state alternatives to state power, the international law con-
text adds state-to-state relations and their overlapping jurisdictional assertions 
to the mix, providing yet another set of possible alternative normative com-
munities to the web of pluralist interactions. 
Finally, pluralism frees scholars from needing an essentialist definition 
of “law.”  For example, with legal pluralism as our analytical frame, we can 
get beyond the endless debates both about whether international law is law at 
all and whether it has any real effect.  Indeed, the whole debate about law 
versus non-law is largely irrelevant in a pluralism context because the key 
questions involve the normative commitments of a community and the     
interactions among normative orders that give rise to such commitments, not 
their formal status.  Thus, we can resist positivist reductionism and set nation-
state law within a broader context.37  Moreover, an emphasis on social norms 
allows us to more readily see how it is that non-state legal norms can have 
significant impact on the world.  After all, if a statement of norms is ultimate-
ly internalized by a population, that statement will have important binding 
force, often even more so than a formal law backed by state sanction.38  Ac-
cordingly, by taking pluralism seriously we will more easily see the way in 
which the contest over norms creates legitimacy over time, and we can put to 
rest the idea that norms not associated with nation-states necessarily lack 
significance.39  Indeed, legal pluralists refuse to focus solely on who has the 
formal authority to articulate norms or the coercive power to enforce them.  
Instead, they aim to study empirically which statements of authority tend to 
be treated as binding in actual practice and by whom.   
  
 37. For those who are inclined to reify state law as law and to deny all other 
forms of social ordering the use of the word law, Santos argues that law is like medi-
cine.  Thus, he observes that  
side by side with the official, professionalized, pharmochemical, allopathic 
medicine, other forms of medicine circulate in society: traditional, herbal, 
community-based, magical, non-Western medicines.  Why should the de-
signation of medicine be restricted to the first type of medicine, the only 
one recognized as such by the national health system?  Clearly, a politics of 
definition is at work here, and its working should be fully unveiled and 
dealt with in its own terms. 
SANTOS, supra note 7, at 91.   
 38. For a discussion of the importance of legal consciousness scholarship to 
international law thinking, see Berman, supra note 3, at 1280-95. 
 39. See id. (critiquing a positivist rational choice approach to international law 
on this ground). 
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In any event, the important point is that scholars studying the global le-
gal scene need not rehash long and ultimately fruitless debates (both in phi-
losophy40 and anthropology41) about what constitutes law and can instead 
take a non-essentialist position: treating as law that which people view as 
law.42  This formulation turns the what-is-law question into a descriptive in-
quiry concerning which social norms are recognized as authoritative sources 
of obligation and by whom.43  Indeed, the question of what constitutes law is 
itself revealed as a terrain of contestation among multiple actors.44  And, by 
broadening the scope of what counts as law, we can turn our attention to a 
more comprehensive investigation of how best to mediate the hybrid spaces 
where normative systems and communities overlap and clash.  
III.  JURISDICTIONAL REDUNDANCY: TRANSNATIONAL, 
INTERNATIONAL, FEDERAL 
As noted above, legal pluralists often look to interactions of state and 
non-state law-making.  But even if we limit our gaze to “official” regulatory 
pronouncements – by international, nation-state, or state authorities – we still 
see a pluralist world of jurisdictional overlaps.  And it is not at all clear that 
sovereigntist line-drawing is the most useful way to respond to such jurisdic-
tional redundancy.  After all, even if it is asserted that certain legal pro-
nouncements are “binding” and others are not, or  that certain authorities are 
“legitimate” while  others  are  not,  the  really  important question is what the 
impact of legal pronouncements are on the ground over time.   
For example, with regard to transnational jurisdictional redundancy, 
consider Spanish efforts to assert jurisdiction over members of the Argentine 
military.  In August 2003, Judge Baltasar Garzón sought extradition from 
Argentina of dozens of Argentines for human rights abuses committed under 
  
 40. Compare, e.g., H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961), with LON L. 
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (rev. ed. 1964), and RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING 
RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977).  
 41. Compare, e.g., MALINOWSKI, supra note 26, with E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE 
LAW OF PRIMITIVE MAN (1954). 
 42. For a statement of this approach, see Tamanaha, supra note 7. 
 43. Such an approach echoes Paul Bohannan’s focus on “double institutionaliza-
tion,”  the  process  whereby  secondary  institutional  arrangements  are  developed to 
assess which primary norms are deemed authoritative.  See Paul Bohannan, Law and 
Legal Institutions, in 9 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 73, 
75 (David L. Sills ed., 1968); see also PHILIPPE NONET & PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW AND 
SOCIETY IN TRANSITION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW 13 (1978) (adopting a similar 
formulation).  
 44. This is one of the reasons anthropologists turned away from the essentialist 
debate.  See LAURA NADER, THE LIFE OF THE LAW 31 (2002). 
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the Argentine military government in the 1970s.45  In addition, Garzón suc-
cessfully sought extradition from Mexico of one former Argentine Navy lieu-
tenant who was accused of murdering hundreds of people.46  In the wake of 
Garzón’s actions, realist observers complained that such transnational prose-
cutions were improper because Argentina had previously conferred amnesty 
on those who had been involved in the period of military rule and therefore 
any prosecution would infringe on Argentina’s  sovereign  “choice”  to  grant 
amnesty.47  Thus,  the sovereigntist view labels the Spanish assertion “illegi-
timate” and denies its importance. 
But the amnesty decision was not simply a unitary choice made by some 
unified “state” of Argentina;  it was a politically contested act that remained 
controversial within the country.48  And the Spanish extradition request itself 
gave President Nestor Kirchner more leverage in his tug-of-war with the legal 
establishment over the amnesty laws.  Just a month after Garzón’s  request, 
both houses of the Argentine Congress voted by large majorities to annul the 
laws.49  Meanwhile the Spanish government decided that it would not make 
the formal extradition request to Argentina that Garzón sought, but it did so 
based primarily on the fact that Argentina had begun to scrap its amnesty 
laws and the accused would therefore be subject to domestic human rights 
prosecution.50  President Kirchner therefore could use Spain’s announcement 
to increase pressure on the Argentine Supreme Court to officially overturn the 
  
 45. See Larry Rohter, Argentine Congress Likely to Void ‘Dirty War’ Amnesties, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2003, at A3 (recounting Garzón’s extradition request). 
 46. Emma Daly, Spanish Judge Sends Argentine to Prison on Genocide Charge, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 2003, at A3 (“In an unusual act of international judicial coop-
eration,  and  a  victory  for  the  Spanish  judge  Baltasar  Garzón,  Mexico’s  Supreme 
Court ruled this month that the former officer, Ricardo Miguel Cavallo, could be 
extradited to Spain for crimes reportedly committed in a third country, Argentina.”).  
 47. See David B. Rivkin Jr. & Lee A. Casey, Crimes Outside the World’s Juris-
diction, N.Y. TIMES, July 22, 2003, at A19 (noting that Argentina had granted amnes-
ty to Cavallo and arguing that “Judge Garzón is essentially ignoring Argentina’s own 
history and desires”). 
 48. The Argentine army, for example, made known its desire for amnesty for 
human rights abuses through several revolts in the late 1980s.  The Argentine Con-
gress granted amnesty after one such uprising in 1987.  See Joseph B. Treaster,    
Argentine President Orders Troops to End Revolt, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1988, § 1, at 
13 (describing an army revolt in Buenos Aires). 
 49. Editorial, Argentina’s Day of Reckoning, CHI. TRIB., Apr. 24, 2004, at C26. 
 50. Elizabeth Nash, Garzón Blocked  over  “Dirty  War”  Extraditions, 
INDEPENDENT, Aug. 30, 2003, at 14; see also Al Goodman, Spain Blocks Trials of 
Argentines, CNN, Aug. 29, 2003, http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/europe 
/08/29/spanish.argentina/index.html (quoting the Spanish attorney for the victims 
saying that the Spanish government’s decision “sends a ‘powerful message’ to Argen-
tina’s Supreme Court” to overturn the amnesty laws). 
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amnesty laws.51  Finally, on June 14, 2005, the Argentine Supreme Court did 
in fact strike down the amnesty laws, thus clearing the way for domestic hu-
man rights prosecutions.52  In the wake of that decision, 772 people, nearly all 
from the military or secret police, face criminal charges and investigations in 
Argentina.53  So, in the end, the “sovereign” state of Argentina made political 
and legal choices to repeal the amnesty laws just as it had previously made 
choices to create them.  But in this change of heart we can see the degree to 
which jurisdictional redundancy may significantly alter the domestic political 
terrain.   
Likewise, Judge Garzón’s earlier efforts  to assert  jurisdiction over  for-
mer Chilean leader Augusto Pinochet,54 though not literally “successful” be-
  
 51. See Héctor Tobar, Judge Orders O fficers F reed: The Argentine Military Men 
Accused  of  Rights  Abuses  in  the  ‘70s  and  ‘80s May  Still  Face  Trials, L.A. TIMES, 
Sept. 2, 2003,  at A3  (“President Nestor Kirchner used Spain’s  announcement  to  in-
crease pressure on the Argentine Supreme Court to overturn the amnesty laws that 
prohibit trying the men here.”). 
 52. Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 14/6/2005, “Simón, Julio Héctor y otros 
s/ privación ilegítima de la libertad,” causa No. 17.768, S.1767.XXXVIII (Arg.); see 
also Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Argentina: Amnesty Laws Struck Down 
(June 14, 2005), available at http://hrw.org/english/docs/2005/06/14 
/argent11119.htm.  Interestingly, the Argentine Court cited as legal precedent a 2001 
decision of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights striking down a similar am-
nesty provision in Peru as incompatible with the American Convention on Human 
Rights and hence without legal effect.  Corte Suprema de Justicia [CSJN], 14/6/2005, 
“Simón, Julio Héctor y otros s/ privación ilegítima de la libertad,” causa No. 17.768, 
S.1767.XXXVIII (Arg.); see also Press Release, Human Rights Watch, supra.  Thus, 
the Inter-American Court pronouncement played an important norm-generating role, 
even though it was not backed by coercive force. 
 53. Slaking a Thirst for Justice, ECONOMIST, Apr. 14, 2007, at 39, 40. 
 54. Judge Garzón issued an arrest order based on allegations of kidnappings, 
torture, and planned disappearances of Chilean citizens and citizens of other coun-
tries.  Spanish Request to Arrest General Pinochet (Oct. 16, 1998), reprinted in THE 
PINOCHET PAPERS: THE CASE OF AUGUSTO PINOCHET IN SPAIN AND BRITAIN 57-59 
(Reed Brody & Michael Ratner eds., 2000) [hereinafter THE PINOCHET PAPERS]; see 
also Anne Swardson, Pinochet Case Tries Spanish Legal Establishment, WASH. POST, 
Oct.  22,  1998,  at  A27  (“As  Chilean  president  from  1973  to  1990,  Garzón’s  arrest 
order  said,  Pinochet  was  ‘the  leader  of  an  international organization created . . . to 
conceive, develop and execute the systematic planning of illegal detentions [kidnap-
pings], torture, forced relocations, assassinations and/or disappearances of numerous 
persons, including Argentines, Spaniards, Britons, Americans, Chileans and other 
nationalities.’” (alteration and omission in original)).  On October 30, 1998, the Span-
ish National Court ruled unanimously that Spanish courts had jurisdiction over the 
matter based both on the principle of universal jurisdiction (that crimes against hu-
manity can be tried anywhere at any time) and the passive personality principle of 
jurisdiction (that courts may try cases if their nationals are victims of crime, regard-
less of where the crime was committed).  S Audiencia Nacional, Nov. 5, 1998 (No. 
173/98), reprinted in THE PINOCHET PAPERS, supra, at 95, 95-107.  For an English 
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cause Pinochet was never extradited to Spain,55 strengthened the hands of 
human rights advocates within Chile itself and provided the impetus for a 
movement that led to a Chilean Supreme Court decision stripping Pinochet of 
his lifetime immunity.56  In 2006 the Chilean court further ruled that Chile 
was subject to the Geneva Conventions during the period of Pinochet’s rule 
and that neither statutes of limitations nor amnesties could be invoked to 
block prosecutions for serious violations of the Conventions, such as war 
crimes or crimes against humanity.57  To date, 148 people, including nearly 
50 military officers, have been convicted for human rights violations commit-
ted during this era, and over 400 more suspects, mostly from the armed 
forces, have been indicted or are under investigation.58  One might even con-
sider Italy’s assertion of  jurisdiction over U.S. CIA agents  for allegedly ab-
ducting a terrorist suspect to be a source of alternative norms concerning the 
appropriate role for civil liberties in the conduct of antiterrorism operations.59  
Such norms may have broader influence over time. 
Turning to international assertions of jurisdiction, we can see again that 
even the potential jurisdictional assertion of an alternative norm-generating 
community can put pressure on local politics.  For example, although interna-
tional courts do not generally have the power to force states to surrender sus-
pects, the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia instituted 
so-called Rule 11 bis proceedings, whereby public hearings were held at the 
  
translation of the opinion, see id.  The Office of the Special Prosecutor alleged that 
Spaniards living in Chile were among those killed under Pinochet’s rule.  Id. at 106. 
 55. Pinochet was physically in Great Britain.  The British House of Lords ulti-
mately ruled that Pinochet was not entitled to head-of-state immunity for acts of tor-
ture and could be extradited to Spain.  Regina v. Bow St. Metro. Stipendiary Magi-
strate, Ex parte Pinochet Ugarte (No. 3), [2000] 1 A.C. 147, 148-49 (H.L. 1999) (ap-
peal taken from Q.B.) (holding that the International Convention Against Torture, 
incorporated into United Kingdom law in 1988, prevented Pinochet from claiming 
head-of-state immunity after 1988 because the universal jurisdiction contemplated by 
the Convention is inconsistent with immunity for former heads of state).  Neverthe-
less, the British government refused to extradite, citing Pinochet’s failing health.  See 
Jack Straw, Sec’y  of State Statement  in  the House of Commons  (Mar.  2, 2000),  in 
THE PINOCHET PAPERS, supra note 54,  at  481, 482  (“[I]n  the  light  of  th[e] medical 
evidence . . . I . . . conclude[d] that no purpose would be served by continuing the 
Spanish extradition request.”).  Pinochet was eventually returned to Chile.  
 56. See Chile’s  Top Court  Strips  Pinochet  of  Immunity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 27, 
2004, at A3 (“Chile’s Supreme Court stripped the former dictator Augusto Pinochet 
of immunity from prosecution in a notorious human rights case on Thursday, raising 
hopes of victims that he may finally face trial for abuses during his 17-year rule.”).  
 57. Slaking a Thirst for Justice, supra note 53, at 39. 
 58. Id. at 39-40. 
 59. See, e.g., Tracy Wilkinson & Maria De Cristofaro, Italy Indicts 33 in Abduc-
tion Case; 26 Americans Charged in Alleged CIA Rendition, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 17, 
2007, at C11, available at 2007 WLNR 3186956. 
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indictment phase.60  Such hearings publicized the various cases and the 
atrocities alleged, thereby helping pressure states to turn over suspects.  And, 
of course, the prosecution of Slobodan Milosevic may well have played at 
least some role in weakening his hold on power in Serbia, perhaps ultimately 
contributing to his ouster from government. 
Even without formal court proceedings, the United Nations can influ-
ence local political realities by asserting forms of jurisdiction.  For example, 
when the UN creates international commissions of inquiry concerning alleged 
atrocities or threatens prosecutions in international courts, such acts can em-
power reformers within local bureaucracies, who can then argue for institu-
tional changes as a way of staving off international interference.  Thus, in the 
aftermath of the violence in East Timor that followed its vote for indepen-
dence, there were grave concerns that the Indonesian government would not 
pursue human rights investigations of the military personnel allegedly re-
sponsible for the violence.61  Accordingly, an International Commission of 
Inquiry was established, and U.N. officials warned that an international court 
might be necessary.62  As with Argentina, such actions strengthened the hand 
of reformers within Indonesia, such as then-Attorney General Marzuki Da-
rusman.  With the specter of international action hanging over Indonesia, 
Darusman made several statements arguing that, for nationalist reasons, a 
hard-hitting Indonesian investigation was necessary in order to forestall an 
international takeover of the process.63  Not surprisingly, when this interna-
tional pressure dissipated after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, so 
did the momentum to provide real accountability in Indonesia for the atroci-
ties committed.64   
  
 60. ICTY Rule 11 bis concerns, inter alia, the procedure by which the Trial 
Chamber issues arrest warrants.  See International Tribunal for the Prosecution of 
Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Com-
mitted in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, Rules for Procedure and 
Evidence, Rule 11 bis, May 30, 2006, IT/32/Rev. 38, available at 
http://www.un.org/icty/legaldoc-e/basic/rpe/IT032Rev38e.pdf.  
 61. See, e.g., Laura A. Dickinson, The Dance of Complementarity: Relationships 
Among Domestic, International, and Transnational Accountability Mechanisms in 
East Timor and Indonesia, in ACCOUNTABILITY FOR ATROCITIES: NATIONAL AND 
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSES 319, 358-61 (Jane E. Stromseth ed., 2003) (discussing 
ways in which international pressure on Indonesia in the period just after East Timor 
gained its independence strengthened the hand of reformers within the Indonesian 
government to push for robust domestic accountability mechanisms for atrocities 
committed during the period leading up to the independence vote). 
 62. Id. at 358-59. 
 63. See id. at 360 (documenting the response of the Indonesian government, 
which appointed an investigative team, identified priority cases, named suspects, and 
collected evidence).  
 64. See id. at 364-66 (discussing the shifting priorities of the Bush administration 
following the 9/11 attacks and tracing the impact of outside pressure in efforts to hold 
individuals accountable for the violence in East Timor). 
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Complementarity regimes are a more formalized way of harnessing the 
potential power of jurisdictional redundancy.  Here the idea is that when two 
legal communities claim jurisdiction over an actor, one community agrees not 
to assert jurisdiction, but only so long as the other community takes action.  
Thus, while one community does not hierarchically impose a solution on the 
other,  it  does  assert  influence  on  the  other’s  domestic process through its 
mere presence as a potential jurisdictional actor in the future. 
The best known complementarity regime in the world today is the one 
enshrined in the statute of the International Criminal Court.  Pursuant to Ar-
ticle 17, the ICC cannot prosecute someone unless the suspect’s home coun-
try is unwilling or unable to investigate.65  Interestingly, the complementarity 
regime has been criticized by both sides in the nation-state sovereign-
ty/international human rights debate.  Thus, sovereigntist voices in the United 
States condemn the ICC as an encroachment on state prerogatives,66 despite 
the fact that ICC jurisdiction over U.S. citizens is easily staved off so long as 
our domestic or military authorities simply conduct the type of investigations 
that a democratic citizenry would normally expect in response to allegations 
of serious human rights abuses.  On the other hand, international human 
rights advocates fear the complementarity regime will permit too many poten-
tial suspects to skirt international justice.67  This concern, however, discounts 
the catalytic impact that even the potential of international prosecutions can 
have. 
The important catalytic function of complementarity has not been lost 
on the ICC prosecutor, Luis Moreno Ocampo.  In one of his first speeches 
upon  assuming  office,  Ocampo  noted  that  “[a]s  a  consequence  of  comple-
mentarity, the number of cases that reach the Court should not be a measure 
[of] its efficiency.  On the contrary, the absence of trials before this Court, as 
a consequence of the regular functioning of national institutions, would be a 
major success.”68  Ocampo therefore announced that he would take a “posi-
tive approach to complementarity,” by encouraging (and perhaps even aiding) 
  
 65. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 17, July 17, 1998, 
2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
 66. See, e.g., Miles A. Pomper, Helms Gives Blunt Message to U .N. Security 
Council: Don’t Tread on U.S., 58 CQ WKLY. 144 (2000) (reporting that Senator Jesse 
Helms “criticized the proposed International Criminal Court as an intrusion on sove-
reignty and stated that the U.S. should be free to pursue unilateral military action 
overseas”). 
 67. See, e.g., Hans-Peter Kaul, Preconditions to the Exercise of Jurisdiction, in 1 
THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 583, 
613 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002) (referring to the rejection of universal jurisdic-
tion as a “painful weakness” of the ICC regime). 
 68. Luis Moreno-Ocampo,  Prosecutor  of  the  Int’l  Criminal  Court,  Statement 
Made at the Ceremony for the Solemn Undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court 2 (June 16, 2003), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/030616_moreno_ocampo_english_final.pdf.  
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national governments to undertake their own investigations and prosecu-
tions.69   
According to William Burke-White, this idea of proactive complemen-
tarity, if it is truly pursued, would create a hybrid system of judicial enforce-
ment for the prosecution of the most serious international crimes, under 
which the ICC and national governments share the ability and the duty to act 
and would therefore necessarily be engaged in a broad series of interactions 
directed towards accountability.  Indeed, the ICC could become a contributor 
to the effective functioning of national judiciaries and investigative bodies.  
Such a policy, Burke-White argues, “could produce a virtuous circle in which 
the Court stimulates the exercise of domestic jurisdiction through the threat of 
international  intervention.”70  Meanwhile, Elena Baylis has documented the 
on-the-ground impact of the ICC even on local prosecutions conducted in 
domestic courts under domestic law.71 
Of course, we should not assume that international jurisdictional asser-
tions always work as a force for increased human rights protections.  As Kim 
Lane Scheppele has documented, recent Security Council resolutions, backed 
by threat of sanctions, require countries to enact antiterrorism legislation and 
adjust antiterrorism policies regardless of domestic, constitutionally-based, 
civil liberties concerns.72  Nevertheless, the important point is to see jurisdic-
tional overlap in the state and supranational spheres as a plural legal space 
where alternative norms are proposed and contested. 
Sometimes, instead of one  jurisdiction  ultimately  adopting  the  other’s 
norms, we may see the existence of jurisdictional redundancy open up space 
for the creation of hybrid substantive norms.  For example, Graeme Dinwoo-
die has argued that national courts should decide international copyright cases 
  
 69. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of  the  Int’l Criminal Court, Statement of 
the Prosecutor to the Diplomatic Corps 1 (Feb. 12, 2004), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/library/organs/otp/LOM_20040212_En.pdf. 
 70. William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International 
Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice, 49 
HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 57 (2008); see also Brian Concannon, Jr., Beyond Complemen-
tarity: The International Criminal Court and National Prosecutions, a View from 
Haiti, 32 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 201 (2000) (discussing ways in which the Inter-
national Criminal Court’s complementarity regime, supplemented with other forms of 
aid, can support local prosecutions). 
 71. See Elena A. Baylis, Reassessing the Role of International Criminal Law: 
Rebuilding National Courts Through Transnational Networks (Univ. of Pittsburgh 
Sch. of Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 2008-06, 
2008), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1105244 (de-
scribing the use by national courts of the ICC’s statute even in domestic trials for war 
crimes and crimes against humanity). 
 72. See Kim Lane Scheppele, The International State of Emergency: Challenges 
to Constitutionalism After September 11, at 3-4 (Sept. 21, 2006) (unpublished manu-
script), available at http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi? 
article=1048&context=schmooze_papers.  
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not by choosing an applicable law, but by devising an applicable solution, 
reflecting the values of all interested systems, national and international, that 
may have a prescriptive claim on the outcome.73  Similarly, where courts 
once simply adjudicated bankruptcies independently, based on the presence 
of assets in their territorial jurisdiction, global insolvencies are now often 
dealt with by courts working cooperatively.74 
In the domestic federalism context, we likewise see jurisdictional redun-
dancy open space for competing views of regulatory issues.  As such, it is 
clear that the existence of overlapping authority provides opportunity for 
contestation.  For example, with regard to climate change, states and localities 
have been pursuing initiatives (sometimes in direct dialogue with internation-
al treaty regimes) that contrast with those preferred by federal authorities.75  
Such activities have even involved states suing the federal government re-
garding regulatory enforcement.76  Similarly, localities have, in recent years, 
sought to create alternative immigration regimes,77 gay marriage proce-
dures,78 securities regulation,79 and foreign policy strategies.80  To be sure, 
some of these initiatives have been beaten back by federal action, either judi-
cial or otherwise.  Yet, as with international legal pronouncements, state ac-
tion has often resulted in changes in popular opinion that have altered the 
regulatory landscape and played a key role in pushing federal authorities to 
act differently than they otherwise would have.  
  
 73. See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, A New Copyright Order: Why National Courts 
Should Create Global Norms, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 469 (2000). 
 74. See generally Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global 
Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457 (1991).  
See also Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
191, 214 (2003); Lore Unt, International Relations and International Insolvency Co-
operation: Liberalism, Institutionalism, and Transnational Legal Dialogue, 28 LAW 
& POL’Y INT’L BUS. 1037 (1997). 
 75. See Esty, supra note 6; Bradley C. Karkkainen, Collaborative Ecosystem 
Governance: Scale, Complexity, and Dynamism, 21 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 189, 214-16 
(2002); Osofsky & Levit, supra note 6.  The dual system of bank regulation in the 
United States is another example.  See Kenneth E. Scott, The Dual Banking System: A 
Model of Competition in Regulation, 30 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1977). 
 76. See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
 77. See, e.g., Federation for American Immigration Reform, Non-Cooperation 
Policies:   “Sanctuary”  for  Illegal  Immigration, http://www.fairus.org/site/PageServer 
?pagename=iic_immigrationissuecenters0173.  
 78. See, e.g., Richard C. Schragger, Cities as Constitutional Actors: The Case of 
Same-Sex Marriage, 21 J.L. & POL. 147 (2005). 
 79. For example, as Robert Ahdieh has recounted, then-New York Attorney 
General Eliot Spitzer’s broad assertions of authority to regulate the New York finan-
cial industry “repeatedly forced the SEC to follow his lead, or at least to join in his 
regulatory endeavors.”  Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, supra note 6, at 865-66. 
 80. See, e.g., Crosby v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). 
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Of course, all of these jurisdictional redundancies might be seen as per-
haps necessary but regrettable concessions to the realities of a world of nor-
mative disagreement.  Such a view would focus on encroachments upon sove-
reignty, concerns about forum shopping, uncertainty about applicable rules, 
litigation costs, and so forth.  In order to minimize such difficulties, we might 
seek international harmonization or stricter territorialist rules to cut off some 
of the overlap.  But such efforts are unlikely ever to be fully practical.  Thus, 
jurisdictional overlap is likely to continue to be a reality.  Moreover, the plu-
ralist framework allows us to see ways in which jurisdictional redundancy 
might be a necessary (and perhaps sometimes a generative) feature of a    
hybrid legal world and not simply a problem to be eliminated.  
IV.  MEDELLÍN THROUGH A PLURALIST LENS 
So far, the focus of this Essay has been largely descriptive, seeking to 
highlight the myriad ways in which a pure sovereigntist vision consisting of 
lines of demarcated legal authority fails to accurately describe the much more 
complex reality on the ground.  Not surprisingly, some look to re-assertions 
of hierarchical legal authority to clean up this messiness.  Thus, even when 
jurisdictional overlap or regulatory interdependence is undeniable, we see 
what Robert Ahdieh has termed “the standard dualist response.”81  Law seeks 
to more effectively delimit each entity's jurisdiction and authority and thereby 
eliminate such overlaps.  This paradigm of jurisdictional line-drawing has 
been prevalent both in the international/transnational realm82 and in          
  
 81. Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, supra note 6, at 867. 
 82. For example, debates in the United States about judicial citation of foreign 
authority have often centered around delineating when it is permissible and when 
impermissible to reference foreign or international law.  See, e.g., Melissa A. Waters, 
Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward Interpretive Incorporation of Human 
Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 628 (2007).  Similarly, theories of jurisdiction 
and choice-of-law have long sought to provide a single answer to the question of 
which law should apply to a cross-border dispute.  Compare Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 
U.S. 714 (1877) (holding that states have complete authority within their territorial 
boundaries but no authority outside those boundaries), with Int’l Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (establishing a test for determining whether an as-
sertion of personal jurisdiction comports with the Due Process Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution based on whether the defendant had sufficient contacts with the relevant 
state  “such  that maintenance  of  the  suit  does  not  offend  ‘traditional notions of fair 
play and substantial justice’” (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940))); 
compare RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 378 (1934) (“The law of the 
place of wrong determines whether a person has  sustained  a  legal  injury.”), with 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. c (1971) (providing a more 
flexible  inquiry  aimed  at  determining  the  place with  the  “most  significant  relation-
ship” to the dispute in question).    
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discussions of federalism,83 as courts and scholars try to demarcate distinct 
spheres for state and federal authority.84 
Yet, this single-minded focus on certainty and clarity not only fails to 
describe a globalized world of inevitable cross-border jurisdictional overlap; 
it also ignores the crucial question of whether leaving open space for such 
overlapping regulatory authority might actually be beneficial.  In this final 
section of the Essay, therefore, I wish to engage in a thought-experiment.  
What if, instead of approaching problems of jurisdictional overlap by insist-
ing on separate sovereign spheres among state, federal, and international au-
thority, we sought to maximize pluralist interaction among various communi-
ties, both state and non-state?  What impact might such a change of lens have 
on the way we approach questions of jurisdictional overlap? 
My vehicle for confronting this question is the ongoing dispute over the 
role of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations85 in state capital cases.  
This dispute has arisen in several different guises so far; the U.S. Supreme 
Court has addressed the issue on four different occasions,86 and the questions 
involved have generated a large scholarly debate.  The most recent iteration, 
Medellín v. Texas,87 focused particularly on the interaction of state, federal, 
and international jurisdiction and regulatory authority and therefore provides 
an excellent opportunity for thinking about how a pluralist lens yields a sig-
nificantly different analytical framework from a sovereigntist one. 
A. The Medellín Dispute 
Because the underlying issues have been much rehearsed in the litera-
ture, I will not rehash all the procedural complexities and doctrinal nuances of 
the Medellín case here.  Essentially, this contentious line of cases arose be-
cause for years various state authorities around the United States, in 
processing suspects in their respective criminal justice systems, ignored (or 
were unaware of) their obligations under the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations, which the federal government signed in 1963.88  The Convention, 
among other things, requires that foreign nationals arrested in a signatory 
country be able to contact their consulate in order to coordinate their defense 
or otherwise help in negotiating a foreign legal system.89  In each of the cases 
  
 83. Schapiro, supra note 6, at 249. 
 84. As Ahdieh notes, “Such reactions are hardly surprising.  At heart, they reflect 
some  visceral  sense  of  law’s  project  as  one  of  categorization,  clear  definition, and 
line-drawing.”  Ahdieh, Dialectical Regulation, supra note 6, at 867.  
 85. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 19. 
 86. Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008); Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 
U.S. 331 (2006); Fed. Republic of Germany v. United States, 526 U.S. 111 (1999); 
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998). 
 87. Medellín 128 S. Ct. 1346. 
 88. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 19. 
 89. Id. art. 36. 
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so far, a foreign national was arrested in the United States, the relevant consu-
late was not notified, and the suspect was subsequently found guilty at trial 
and sentenced to death. 
Under the terms of the Vienna Convention, the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) is the legal entity given jurisdiction to adjudicate claims con-
cerning alleged violations of the Convention.90  In early 2003 Mexico in-
itiated proceedings against the United States in the ICJ, claiming that among 
those sentenced to death in violation of their Vienna Convention rights were 
52 Mexican nationals.91  The United States participated in the proceedings 
before the ICJ, which ultimately ruled, in the Avena case, that the United 
States had breached Article 36(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention in the cases of 
51 of the Mexican nationals by failing “to inform detained Mexican nationals 
of their rights under that paragraph” and “to notify the Mexican consular post 
of the[ir] detention.”92  The ICJ held further that in 49 of the cases, the United 
States had also violated its obligations under Article 36(1)(a) “to enable Mex-
ican consular officers to communicate with and have access to their nationals, 
as well as its obligation under paragraph 1(c) of that Article regarding the 
right of consular officers to visit their detained nationals.”93  Finally, the ICJ 
held that in 34 cases, the United States had also violated its obligation under 
Article  36(1)(c)  “to  enable  Mexican  consular  officers  to  arrange for legal 
representation of their nationals.”94 
Significantly, however, the ICJ denied Mexico’s request for annulment 
of the convictions and sentences.95  Instead, the ICJ required only that United 
States courts provide review and reconsideration of the convictions and sen-
tences of the 51 Mexican nationals to determine whether the violations of the 
Vienna Convention prejudiced the various defendants’ ability to obtain a fair 
trial.96  All that was necessary, according to the ICJ, was that this review be 
conducted as part of a “judicial process” and could not be barred by any pro-
cedural default doctrines that might otherwise thwart such review.97   
At the time the ICJ decision was issued, Jose Ernesto Medellín’s appli-
cation for a certificate of appealability from the denial of federal habeas relief 
was pending before the Fifth Circuit.  Medellín, having been convicted in 
Texas state court, was one of the Mexican nationals whose case was ad-
dressed in the ICJ’s judgment.  Nevertheless,  the Fifth Circuit, following its 
own precedent, ruled that Article 36 of the Vienna Convention was not judi-
  
 90. Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Vien-
na Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 19.  
 91. Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 
I.C.J. 12, 17, 23 (Mar. 31). 
 92. Id. at 53-54, 71-72. 
 93. Id. at 54, 71-72. 
 94. Id. at 54-55, 71, 72. 
 95. Id. at 60-61. 
 96. Id. at 72. 
 97. Id. at 65-66. 
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cially enforceable.98  Medellín petitioned for certiorari, which the U.S. Su-
preme Court granted.99 
While the appeal in the U.S. Supreme Court was pending, President 
Bush issued a signed, written determination that state courts must provide the 
required review and reconsideration to the 51 Mexican nationals named in the 
ICJ judgment, including Mr. Medellín, notwithstanding any state procedural 
rules that might otherwise bar review of their claims.100  The President de-
clared: 
I have determined, pursuant to the authority vested in me as Presi-
dent by the Constitution and laws of the United States . . . , that the 
United States will discharge its international obligation[s] under 
the decision of the International Court of Justice in [Avena], by 
having State courts give effect to the decision in accordance with 
general principles of comity in cases filed by the 51 Mexican na-
tionals addressed in that decision.101 
That same day, the United States filed an amicus brief in Medellín’s  case 
stating that  the United States had a “paramount interest  .  .  .  in prompt com-
pliance” with the ICJ judgment.102  Specifically, the President had determined 
that compliance would “serve[]  to protect  the interests of United States citi-
zens abroad, promote[] the effective conduct of foreign relations, and       
underscore[]  the United States’  commitment  in  the  international community 
to the rule of law.”103  The United States stressed that “[c]onsular assistance is 
a vital safeguard for Americans abroad, and the government has determined 
that, unless the United States fulfills its international obligation to achieve 
compliance with the ICJ Avena decision, its ability to secure such assistance 
could be adversely affected.”104    
Moreover, the U.S. brief stated that pursuant to the President's determi-
nation,  an  individual Mexican  national  named  in  the  judgment  “may  file  a 
petition in state court seeking [the] review and reconsideration [ordered by 
the ICJ], and the state courts are to recognize” the ICJ decision.105  In such a 
case, “a state court would not be free to reexamine whether the ICJ correctly 
  
 98. Medellín v. Dretke, 371 F.3d 270, 280 (5th Cir. 2004). 
 99. Medellín v. Dretke, 543 U.S. 1032 (2004).  
 100. Memorandum from George W. Bush to the Attorney General (Feb. 28, 
2005), app. 2 to Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, 
Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04-5928), 2005 WL 504490.  
 101. Id.  
 102. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondent, supra note 
100, at 41.  
 103. Id.  
 104. Id.  
 105. Id. at 42.  
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determined the facts or correctly interpreted the Vienna Convention.”106  Fi-
nally, state procedural rules that might otherwise prevent a state court from 
giving effect to the ICJ judgment “must give way.”107 
The U.S. Supreme Court dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted, 
“[i]n  light of the possibility that the Texas courts [would] provide Medellín 
with the review he seeks pursuant to the Avena judgment and the President’s 
memorandum.”108  The Court did, however, note that it could once again re-
view the case if further proceedings did not provide Medellín with the relief 
he sought.109 
Back before the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the issue became 
whether Medellín’s habeas petition was barred by Texas Criminal Procedure 
law regulating applications by petitioners who have previously sought post-
conviction relief.  Medellín argued that the ICJ judgment and the President's 
determination to comply with it constituted binding federal law that, by virtue 
of the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, preempted any 
inconsistent provisions of Texas law.110  Meanwhile, the United States, as 
amicus curiae, urged the Texas court to grant Medellín the review and recon-
sideration he sought, on the ground that the President’s determination consti-
tuted preemptive federal law.111 
Nevertheless, on November 15, 2006, the Texas court dismissed Me-
dellín’s application, holding  that Texas  law barred  the petition and  that nei-
ther the ICJ decision nor the President’s determination pre-empted or super-
ceded local law.112  The U.S. Supreme Court ultimately agreed. 113  The     
six-member majority sought to draw clear lines between the spheres of au-
thority at issue in the case.  In this vein, the Court first held that while an in-
ternational treaty may create an international commitment of sorts, it is not 
binding domestic law unless the treaty is explicitly implemented through 
domestic  regulation  or  ratified  by  Congress  as  a  “self-executing”  treaty.114  
Second, with regard to the Presidential Order, the Court similarly sought to 
define clear lines of authority, ruling that neither the President’s power under 
the Treaty itself, nor his power to conduct foreign affairs, nor his power to 
“take care” that laws are faithfully executed authorized the President to turn a 
non-self-executing treaty into a self-executing treaty, absent congressional 
  
 106. Id. at 46. 
 107. Id. at 43.  
 108. Medellín v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660, 666 (2005) (per curiam).    
 109. Id. at 664 n.1. 
 110. He also argued that, in any case, he satisfied the requirements of the Texas 
law.  Ex parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d 315, 324 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).  
 111. Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae at 49-50, Ex parte Medellín, 223 
S.W.3d 315 (No. AP-75,207), 2005 WL 3142648. 
 112. Ex parte Medellín, 223 S.W.3d at 351-52. 
 113. See Medellín v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1349-50 (2008). 
 114. Id. at 1356-67. 
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action.115  Thus, given the lack of international or presidential authority in the 
matter, the Court held that Texas was free to ignore both the ICJ ruling and 
the presidential directive.116  The Court’s  approach  envisions no  interaction 
among multiple sources of law, no interplay among multiple pronouncers of 
law, and no accommodation to the multiple interests at stake. 
B. Principles of Pluralism 
As noted previously, a great deal has already been written about the is-
sues raised by the Medellín case.  But most of it involves the sorts of        
sovereigntist line-drawing discussed above.  Thus, the questions revolve 
around the degree to which the obligations of the Vienna Convention, or the 
ICJ decision, or the presidential statement can reach into Texas and encroach 
on Texas’s sovereign prerogative to follow its procedural default rules.  The 
U.S. Supreme Court’s decision follows these broad lines of debate and expli-
citly seeks to draw clear lines of demarcation between the multiple sources of 
law at issue in the case.    
Instead of that debate, however, I’d like us to imagine a different set of 
inquiries.  What if we were to try to conceptualize a more interactive system 
of relationships among these three governmental entities (as well as other 
possibly relevant non-governmental communities), keeping in mind the po-
tential benefits of legal pluralism, jurisdictional redundancy, and inter-
systemic governance?  What would such an interaction look like? 
In order to facilitate such an inquiry, we first need to consider the gener-
al principles that might guide our understanding of pluralist interactions.  As I 
have discussed elsewhere,117 a pluralist approach generally eschews solutions 
that are either universalist on the one hand, or territorialist on the other.  
Thus, we look neither to one overarching law that trumps all others, nor to a 
territorially delimited set of hermetically-sealed spheres of law.  Instead, a 
pluralist approach deploys the following five ideas: 
First, a pluralist approach to managing jurisdictional overlap should not 
attempt to erase the reality of that overlap.  Indeed, arguably the desire to 
“solve”  such  problems  is  precisely  what  has  made  conflict  of  laws  such  a 
conceptually dissatisfying field for so long.  Each generation seeks a new way 
(or often the revival of an old way) to divine an answer to what is at its root 
an unanswerable question: which territorially-based state community’s norms 
should govern a dispute that, by definition is not easily situated territorially 
and necessarily involves affiliations with multiple communities?  
Second, and relatedly, a pluralist framework recognizes that normative 
conflict is unavoidable and therefore instead of trying to erase conflict, it 
seeks to manage it through procedural mechanisms, institutions, and practices 
  
 115. Id. at 1367-71. 
 116. Id. at 1372. 
 117. See Berman, supra note 6. 
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that might at least draw the participants to the conflict into a shared social 
space.  This approach draws on Ludwig Wittgenstein’s idea that agreements 
are reached principally through participation in common forms of life, rather 
than agreement on substance.118  Or, as political theorist Chantal Mouffe has 
put it, we need to transform  “enemies”  – who have no common symbolic 
space – into “adversaries.”119  Adversaries, according to Mouffe, are “friendly 
enemies”:  friends  because  they  “share  a  common  symbolic  space  but  also 
enemies because they want to organize this common symbolic space in a 
different way.”120  Ideally, law – and particularly legal mechanisms for man-
aging hybridity – can function as the sort of common symbolic space that 
Mouffe envisions and can therefore play a constructive role in transforming 
enemies into adversaries.   
Third, in order to help create this sort of shared social space, procedural 
mechanisms, institutions, and practices for managing overlap should encour-
age decisionmakers to wrestle explicitly with questions of multiple communi-
ty affiliation and the effects of activities across territorial borders, rather than 
shunting aside normative difference.  As a result, a pluralist framework in-
vites questions that otherwise might not be asked: How are communities ap-
propriately defined in today’s world?  To what degree do people act based on 
affiliations with non-state or supranational communities?  How should the 
various norm-generating communities in the global system interact so as to 
provide opportunities for contestation and expression of difference?  Such 
questions must be considered carefully in order to develop mechanisms that 
will take seriously the multifaceted interplay among such communities. 
Fourth, thinking in more pluralist terms forces consideration of so-called 
“conflicts values,” particularly the independent benefit that may accrue when 
domestic judicial and regulatory decisions take into account a broader interest 
in a smoothly functioning overlapping international legal order, reflecting 
what Justice Blackmun called “the systemic value of reciprocal tolerance and 
goodwill.”121  For example, under the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution,122 a valid judgment issued by one state must be enforced by 
every other state even if the judgment being enforced would be illegal if it 
had been issued by the enforcing state in the first instance.123  Thus, the con-
  
 118. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 241 (G. E. M. 
Anscombe trans., 3d ed. 1953). 
 119. CHANTAL MOUFFE, THE DEMOCRATIC PARADOX 13 (2000). 
 120. Id. 
 121. Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522, 
555 (1987) (Blackmun, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 122. See U.S. CONST. art.  IV, § 1  (“Full Faith and Credit  shall be given in each 
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.  And 
the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records 
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.”). 
 123. See, e.g., Baker v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998) (making 
clear that there is no public policy exception to the full faith and credit due judg-
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flicts value of respecting an interlocking national system outweighs individu-
al parochial interests.  And though the domestic example is made easier by 
the existence of a constitutional command, such considerations should always 
be part of any mechanism for addressing the overlap of plural legal systems.  
Moreover, taking account of these sorts of systemic values should be seen as 
a necessary part of how communities pursue their interests in the world, not 
as a restraint on pursuing such interests.  After all, if it is true that communi-
ties cannot exist in isolation from each other, then there is a long-term pa-
rochial benefit from not insisting on narrow parochial interest and instead 
establishing mechanisms for trying to defer to others’ norms where possible.   
Fifth, even a system that respects conflicts values will, of course, some-
times find a foreign law so anathema that the law will not be enforced.  Thus, 
embracing pluralism in no way requires a full embrace of every external legal 
pronouncement.  But when such “public policy” exceptions are invoked with-
in a pluralist framework, they should be treated as unusual occasions requir-
ing strong normative statements regarding the contours of the public policy.  
This means that, as Robert Cover envisioned, a jurispathic act that “kills off” 
another community’s normative commitment is always at least accompanied 
by an equally strong normative commitment.  The key point is to make deci-
sionmakers self-conscious about their necessary jurispathic actions.  Only 
such an approach has any chance of keeping adversaries from turning into 
enemies. 
Finally, as noted above, a pluralist framework must always be            
understood as a middle ground between strict territorialism on the one hand 
and universalism on the other.  The key, therefore, is to try to articulate and 
maintain a balance between those two poles.  As such, successful mechan-
isms or institutions will be those that simultaneously celebrate both local var-
iation and international order, while recognizing the importance of preserving 
both multiple sites for contestation and an interlocking system of reciprocity 
and exchange.  Of course, actually doing that in difficult cases is a Herculean 
and perhaps impossible task.  Certainly, mutual agreement about contested 
normative issues is unlikely and, as discussed previously, possibly even unde-
sirable.  Thus, the best we can do is develop ways to seek as much mutual 
accommodation as possible, while keeping some “play” in the joints so  that 
diversity is respected.  Such play in the joints also allows for the jurisgenera-
  
ments); see also, e.g., Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 546 (1948) (“[The Full Faith and 
Credit Clause] ordered submission . . . even to hostile policies reflected in the judg-
ment of another State, because the practical operation of the federal system, which the 
Constitution  designed,  demanded  it.”); Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 
U.S. 268, 277 (1935) (“In numerous cases this court has held that credit must be given 
to the judgment of another state, although the forum would not be required to enter-
tain the suit on which the judgment was founded . . . .”); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 
230, 237 (1908) (holding that the judgment of a Missouri court is entitled to full faith 
and credit in Mississippi even if the Missouri judgment rested on a misapprehension 
of Mississippi law). 
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tive possibilities inherent in having multiple law-making communities and 
multiple norms.   
Taken together, these principles provide a set of criteria for evaluating 
the ways in which legal systems interact.  As noted above, jurisdictional over-
laps may sometimes be problematic, and there might be some occasions that 
would justify the imposition of either a universal norm or a local rule.  But 
such impositions would need to be justified through a strong normative ar-
gument.  More usually, we would instead seek intersystemic compromises – 
institutional interactions that allow space for dialogue, multiple voices, and 
creative innovation.   
For example, consider the oft-discussed  “margin of  appreciation” doc-
trine of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR).124  The idea here is to 
strike a balance between deference to national courts and legislators on the 
one hand, and maintaining “European  supervision”  that  “empower[s  the 
ECHR] to give the final ruling” on whether a challenged practice is compati-
ble with the Convention, on the other.125  The margin of appreciation allows 
domestic polities some room to maneuver in implementing ECHR decisions 
in order to accommodate local variation.  How big that margin is depends on 
a number of factors including, for example, the degree of consensus among 
the member states.  Thus, in a case involving parental rights of transsexuals, 
the ECHR noted that because there was at that time no common European 
standard and “the law appear[ed] to be in a transitional stage,” the respondent 
State was “afforded a wide margin of appreciation.”126 
Affording this sort of variable margin of appreciation usefully accom-
modates a limited range of pluralism.  It does not permit domestic courts to 
fully ignore the supranational pronouncement (though domestic courts have 
sometimes asserted greater independence127).  Nevertheless, it does allow 
space for local variation, particularly when the law is in transition or when no 
consensus exists among member states on a given issue.  Moreover, by fram-
ing the inquiry as one of local consensus, the margin of appreciation doctrine 
disciplines the ECHR and forces it to move incrementally, pushing towards 
consensus without running too far ahead of it.  Finally, the margin of appreci-
  
 124. A  particularly  useful,  succinct  summary  of  the  “margin  of  appreciation” 
doctrine can be found in Laurence R. Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Toward a 
Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 316-17 (1997).  
My discussion here largely tracks theirs. 
 125. Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, No. 30, 2 Eur. H.R. Rep. 245, 276 
(1979). 
 126. X v. United Kingdom, No. 21830/93, 24 Eur. H.R. Rep. 143, 144 (1997); see 
also Otto-Preminger Inst. v. Austria, No. 295-A, 19 Eur. H.R. Rep. 34,  (1994) (find-
ing that the lack of a uniform European conception of rights to freedom of expression 
“directed against the religious feelings of others” dictates a wider margin of apprecia-
tion). 
 127. See Berman, supra note 6, at 1198-99 (discussing resistance of the German 
Constitutional Court to the ECHR). 
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ation functions as a signaling mechanism, through which “the ECHR is able 
to identify potentially problematic practices for the contracting states before 
they actually become violations, thereby permitting the states to anticipate 
that their laws may one day be called into question.”128  And, of course, there 
is reverse signaling as well, because domestic states, by their societal evolu-
tion away from consensus, effectively maintain space for local variation. 
C . Medellín Through a Pluralist Lens 
Turning to Medellín, a pluralist approach would, first of all, seek to pre-
serve spaces for interaction among the various communities involved.  Thus, 
a pluralist approach would eschew the positions put forth by hardline interna-
tional law triumphalists, who argue that the violations of the Vienna Conven-
tions necessarily invalidate all the various convictions, regardless of Texas 
law on the matter.  But, a pluralist would also reject the hardline sovereigntist 
idea that Texas should focus only on its own law and pay no attention to the 
Vienna Convention or the pronouncements of the ICJ.  And finally, the Bush 
administration’s efforts simply to take the issue away from the state by order-
ing adherence to the ICJ decision also would be rejected. 
So, what are we left with?  Let us start with the ICJ.  In a pluralist ac-
count, the ICJ does not necessarily trump all other decisionmakers simply 
because it is an international body enforcing universalist treaty-based norms.  
Instead, the Court should take seriously the prerogatives and interests of other 
relevant communities and only squelch those other communities if it justifies 
why it needs to act jurispathically by attempting to kill off competing views.   
To get some sense of what I mean, we may return to Robert Cover for a 
moment.  In his article Nomos and Narrative,129 Cover criticized the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s decision in Bob Jones University v. United States130  In that 
case, the Internal Revenue Service had interpreted Section 501(c)(3) of the 
Internal Revenue Code, which gives tax-exempt status to qualifying charita-
ble institutions, to apply to schools only if such schools have a “racially non-
discriminatory  policy  as  to  students.”   Accordingly,  the  Service  denied tax 
  
 128. Helfer & Slaughter, supra note 124, at 317; see also Laurence R. Helfer, 
Consensus, Coherence and the European Convention on Human Rights, 26 CORNELL 
INT’L L.J. 133, 141 (1993).  For an example of this type of signaling, see J. G. 
MERRILLS, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE EUROPEAN COURT OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 81 (2d ed. 1993) (interpreting the ECHR’s statement in Rees v. Unit-
ed Kingdom, 106 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) at 19 (1986), that “‘[t]he need for appropriate 
legal measures [to protect transsexuals] should therefore be kept under review having 
regard particularly to scientific and societal developments’”  as  a  “strong  hint that 
while British practice currently satisfied [the Convention], the Court’s duty to interp-
ret the Convention as a living instrument may lead it to a different conclusion in the 
future”). 
 129. Cover, supra note 23. 
 130. 461 U.S. 574 (1983). 
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exemption to Bob Jones University, which had not admitted blacks at all until 
1971 and had admitted them thereafter but had forbidden interracial dating, 
interracial marriage, the espousal of violation of these prohibitions, and 
membership in groups that advocated interracial marriage.  Crucial to the case 
was the fact that the University grounded its rule not on racial attitudes, but 
on Biblical scripture.  The school, therefore, considered the exclusion of in-
terracial dating to be a principal tenet of its religious community.   Neverthe-
less, although the text of section 501(c)(3) did not speak to racial discrimina-
tion at all, the Supreme Court upheld the IRS determination, finding the ser-
vice’s interpretation of the Code provision to be permissible.   
Cover criticized the reasoning of the Bob Jones decision, even while 
agreeing with the Court’s result.  According to Cover, the Court assumed “a 
position that places nothing at risk and from which the Court makes no inter-
pretive gesture at all, save the quintessential gesture to the jurisdictional ca-
nons: the statement that an exercise of political authority was not unconstitu-
tional.”131  In particular, Cover argued that by grounding its decision on an 
interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code, the Court had side-stepped the 
crucial constitutional question of whether Congress could grant tax exemp-
tions to schools that discriminated on the basis of race.  This was a problem 
for Cover because he believed that if a state legal authority were going to 
“kill off” the competing normative commitment of an alternative community, 
it should do so based on a profound normative commitment of its own.132  By 
avoiding the constitutional question, Cover complained, the Court had dis-
served both the religious community – whose normative commitments would 
be placed at the mercy of mere public policy judgments – and racial minori-
ties – who “deserved a constitutional commitment to avoiding public subsidi-
zation of racism.”133 
In contrast, had the clash between the university’s religious rule and the 
IRS code, or between the religious rule and the U.S. Constitution, been 
viewed from a pluralist perspective, two aspects of the case would have been 
clarified.  First, the Court would have analyzed and defined the relevant 
community affiliations at stake.  Second, the Court would have been forced to 
grapple with the strength of its commitment to the principle of non-
discrimination, just as Cover urged.  As a result, instead of simply asserting 
federal law, a pluralist analysis encourages negotiation among the different 
norms advanced by different communities. 
Unlike the U.S. Supreme Court in the Bob Jones case, the ICJ in Me-
dellín did indeed attempt explicitly to justify its universalist position, discuss-
ing at great length the need for an interlocking and reciprocal system of con-
sular rights.  In addition, the Tribunal took seriously the competing claims to 
a limited sphere of local autonomy.    Thus,  as with  the  ECHR’s margin  of 
  
 131. Cover, supra note 23, at 66. 
 132. See id. at 52-60. 
 133. Id. at 67. 
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appreciation doctrine, the ICJ attempted to be restrained in imposing its inter-
national norm, thereby trying to leave as much space as possible for local 
variation.    Accordingly,  the  ICJ  denied Mexico’s  request to invalidate the 
convictions altogether.  Instead, the ICJ decision asks only for a serious judi-
cial consideration of possible prejudice.  Finally, using a pluralist analysis, 
the ICJ decision is more justifiable if it is giving voice to the norms of com-
munities that are not necessarily represented adequately in other fora, either 
because they are not parties to the suit or have no centralized voice.  Here, for 
example, the communities who might care about reciprocal consular rights 
(U.S. citizens who travel abroad, potential immigrants who may be more 
reluctant to enter the country for fear of becoming trapped in the criminal 
justice system, and so on) are dispersed and have no real ability to advance 
their interests.  Similarly, there were significant voices within Texas itself 
who may have wanted these consular rights to be protected.  For example, 
Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott implemented a comprehensive set of 
reforms at the local level to try to make sure Vienna Convention rights are 
protected in the future.134  The ICJ decision can, therefore, be seen as giving 
voice to these alternative epistemic communities. 
Turning to Texas, from a pluralist point of view, a decision of the ICJ is 
not necessarily binding absent a local decision to be bound.  In some sense 
this is no different from what happens in run-of-the-mill domestic cases.  
Enforcement of any legal decision depends on whether those who assert ju-
risdiction can rhetorically persuade those who possess coercive power (the 
police force, the military) to enforce the judgment issued.  It is, of course, a 
commonplace to say that courts lack their own enforcement power, making 
them dependent on the willingness of states and individuals to follow judicial 
orders.135  And, because courts can only exercise authority to the extent that 
someone with coercive power chooses to carry out the legal judgments is-
sued, judges need, in a sense, to rhetorically persuade others within the gov-
ernment that what they have to say should have force.    
Of course, just because the ICJ decision is not hierarchically binding on 
Texas does not mean it should be ignored altogether.  Rather, the Texas Court 
of Criminal Appeals should treat the ICJ decision similarly to the way it 
might think about recognition of judgments in the choice of law context.  The 
judgment recognition inquiry considers under what circumstances a commu-
  
 134. See GREG ABBOTT, ATTORNEY GEN. OF TEX., MAGISTRATE’S GUIDE TO 
CONSULAR NOTIFICATION UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION (2006), available at 
http://www.oag.state.tx.us/AG_Publications/pdfs/vienna_guidebook.pdf.  For further 
discussion of local governmental and nongovernmental initiatives to increase com-
pliance with the Vienna Convention, see Janet Koven Levit, Sanchez-Llamas v. Ore-
gon: The Glass is Half Full, 11 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 29, 40-46 (2007). 
 135. C f., e.g., ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 246 
(Sanford Levinson rev., 4th ed. 2005) (noting that the U.S. Supreme Court has main-
tained its power in part because “it is hard to find a single historical instance when the 
Court stood firm for very long against a really clear wave of public demand”). 
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nity should recognize and enforce a prior ruling of another community.  A 
pure sovereigntist might answer, “Never.”   After all, what  if  the prior  judg-
ment was based on an entirely different set of governing norms?  Why should 
such a ruling be enforced?  And yet, as discussed previously, often foreign 
judgments are recognized and enforced.136 
Moreover, while the decision to enforce a judgment surely will be less 
automatic when the judgment at issue was rendered by a court whose govern-
ing norms are less familiar, the important point is that the decision to enforce 
a foreign judgment is fundamentally different from the decision to issue an 
original judgment, and it should not be treated as equivalent.  This is because 
judgment recognition implicates an entirely distinct set of concerns about the 
role of courts in a plural order.  Thus, courts might consider the independent 
value of participating in an interlocking legal system, where deference to 
other community judgments is likely to have long-term reciprocal benefits.  
As  Judge  Cardozo  has  observed:  “We  are  not  so  provincial  as  to  say  that 
every solution of a problem is wrong because we deal with it otherwise at 
home.”137 
This is not to say, of course, that foreign judgments should always be 
enforced.  Indeed, even employing a more pluralist approach, one would ex-
pect that judges might sometimes interpose local public policies where they 
would not in the domestic state-to-state setting.  But if we acknowledge the 
importance of the values effectuated by strong judgment recognition, we will 
necessarily reject the idea that Texas is simply unable to enforce the ICJ 
judgment just because the local procedural default rule would have barred the 
Texas court from hearing the appeal had it come directly to the court.  Thus, 
there will always need to be engagement with the foreign statement of norms; 
one could not simply reject the foreign as alien and therefore place it auto-
matically beyond consideration.  
In order to see an example of how this sort of engagement might work, 
consider the 2004 decision of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in a 
  
 136. In most areas of law, United States courts have generally enforced foreign 
judgments as a matter of comity.  See Mark D. Rosen, Exporting the Constitution, 53 
EMORY L.J. 171,  176  (2004)  (noting  that,  since  the  nineteenth  century,  “the United 
States has been at the vanguard of enforcing foreign judgments”).  Indeed, as far back 
as 1895, in Hilton v. Guyot, the U.S. Supreme Court made clear  that comity “is the 
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or 
judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and con-
venience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the 
protection of its laws.”  159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895).  The Second Restatement codifies 
this idea, noting that a “judgment rendered in a foreign nation . . . will, if valid, usual-
ly be given the same effect as a sister State judgment.”  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONFLICTS OF LAW § 117, cmt. c (1971).  Moreover, validity is based only on whether 
the court that rendered judgment had proper personal jurisdiction over the parties and 
utilized procedures that were not inherently unfair.  Id. § 92.   
 137. Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 201 (N.Y. 1918). 
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similar Vienna Convention case, Torres v. Oklahoma.138  Responding to an 
identical ICJ order, the Court stayed a pending execution and remanded the 
case for an evidentiary hearing to determine, in part, whether Torres was 
“prejudiced by the State’s violation of his Vienna Convention rights.”139  The 
Governor  commuted  Torres’  sentence  to  life  in prison without parole later 
that day.   
Although a hardline sovereigntist might see the Oklahoma court’s defe-
rence to the ICJ decision as inappropriate and an abdication of the autonomy 
of the Oklahoma courts, looking at the decision from a pluralist perspective 
helps to clarify the issues at stake.  After all, as noted above, United States 
courts routinely enforce judgments issued by foreign tribunals.  As far back 
as 1895, in Hilton v. Guyot, the U.S. Supreme Court made clear that comity 
“is the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legisla-
tive, executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to 
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of 
other persons who are under the protection of its laws.”140  The Restatement 
(Second) of Conflict of Laws codified this idea, noting that a “judgment ren-
dered in a foreign nation . . . will, if valid, usually be given the same effect as 
a sister State judgment.”141  Moreover, validity is based only on whether the 
court that rendered judgment had proper personal jurisdiction over the parties 
and utilized procedures that were not inherently unfair.142  
To be sure, courts enforcing foreign judgments (as opposed to domestic 
ones) have applied a public policy exception to avoid enforcing particularly 
egregious rulings, but the exception has been construed very narrowly.  Ac-
cordingly,  courts only  refuse  to enforce “where  the original  claim  is  repug-
nant to fundamental notions of what is decent and just in the State where  
enforcement is sought.”143  Likewise, the United Nations Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards and the Uniform 
Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition Act require that a U.S. court enforce 
a judgment or arbitral award unless there is fraud or if doing so would be 
repugnant to the public policy of the enforcing forum.  Thus, in most recogni-
tion  of  judgments  cases,  “[c]ourts  consistently  have  enforced  foreign  judg-
ments even if they would have refused to entertain suit on the original claim 
on grounds of public policy.”144 
Thinking of Medellín and Torres using a judgment recognition frame 
encourages courts to consider the normative community that the ICJ decision 
represents.  This normative community, significantly, includes the United 
  
 138. Torres v. State (Torres II), No. PCD-04-442, 2004 WL 3711623 (Okla. 
Crim. App. May 13, 2004). 
 139. Id. at *1. 
 140. 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895). 
 141. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW § 117, cmt. c (1971). 
 142. Id. § 92. 
 143. Id. § 117. 
 144. Rosen, supra note 136, at 178-79. 
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States.  Indeed, the Optional Protocol to the Vienna Convention, which makes 
the ICJ the venue to consider all “[d]isputes arising out of  the interpretation 
or application”  of  the Convention,145 was not only ratified but also drafted 
(and championed) by the United States in the first place.   
Thus, as Judge Chapel wrote in a special, unpublished concurrence to 
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals’ decision,146 the United States free-
ly and consensually signed and ratified the Vienna Convention, including the 
Optional Protocol, creating binding, contract-like legal obligations between 
the United States and other State Parties.  The Court of Criminal Appeals was 
therefore “bound by the Vienna Convention and Optional Protocol” and was 
obligated “to give effect” to both.147  And the ICJ decision, because it was a 
“product of the process set forth in the Optional Protocol” deserved, accord-
ing to Judge Chapel, the Court of Criminal Appeals’ “full faith and credit.”148  
By conceiving of the ICJ decision’s  force  in  pluralist  terms,  Judge Chapel 
was able to stave off concerns about encroachments on local state sovereign-
ty. 
Further, the concept of sovereignty is unhelpful to resolve the Texas (or 
Oklahoma) case because  there  is no monolithic set of “state interests”  to be 
effectuated; there are myriad voices within Texas.  Texas must interact with 
the world, its citizens go abroad and might well want their consular notifica-
tion rights honored, the Texas Attorney General has actively attempted to 
educate local law enforcement concerning Vienna Convention rights, and so 
on.  In addition, the procedural default rule at issue here was most likely not 
enacted specifically with foreign defendants in mind.  As Graeme Dinwoodie 
has argued in a different context, “statutory rules enacted by a national     
legislature are rarely enacted with an eye to international disputes or         
conduct.”149  And even when legislators actually consider activities abroad, 
they do so to pursue domestic policy priorities, with little consideration for 
multistate implications.150  Thus, a choice-of-law regime that only offers two 
options (the home state or the foreign one) improperly insists on judging citi-
zens according to a single state norm in a world where those citizens affiliate 
with multiple states or nations.  Indeed, the mere fact that a dispute is multi-
national necessarily means that it implicates interests that are different from a 
purely domestic dispute.  Accordingly, judges should consider these added 
factors and craft rules based on a variety of national and international legal 
norms.  Here, there are obviously lots of additional interests at play to distin-
guish the case from a purely domestic one, including concerns about diplo-
  
 145. Optional Protocol Concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes, Vien-
na Convention on Consular Relations, supra note 19. 
 146. See Torres v. State (Torres II), No. PCD-04-442, 2004 WL 3711623, at *2 
(Okla. Crim. App. May 13, 2004) (Chapel, J., concurring). 
 147. Id.  
 148. Id. at *3.   
 149. Dinwoodie, supra note 73, at 548-49. 
 150. Id. at 549. 
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macy, foreign relations, citizens abroad, the federal government’s  stated  in-
terest in compliance with the ICJ order, and so on. 
Finally, as noted above, the ICJ did satisfy the two requirements for the 
sort of intersystemic jurisdictional assertions that should command deference.  
First, it provided a detailed justification for its decision to intervene in an 
otherwise seemingly “local” criminal case.   Second,  it  issued a very  limited 
order, not attempting to overturn the convictions involved in toto, but instead 
simply asking for a further evidentiary hearing.  Thus, the ICJ attempted a 
nuanced balance of international and local interests, and the decision there-
fore deserves a similar kind of deference and accommodation from the Texas 
court.  Indeed, once the distorting filter of Texas’ purported sovereign power 
is put aside, this seems like a relatively easy call. 
And what about the federal government?  From a pluralist perspective, 
the Bush Administration was wrong on both parts of its argument.  First, con-
trary to the Solicitor General’s contention before the U.S. Supreme Court, the 
ICJ decision should be deemed applicable to the states (at least in the judg-
ment recognition sense described above), regardless of the position of the 
executive branch.  Second, to the extent that the administration relied on a 
preemption or supremacy rationale to justify trumping the Texas procedural 
bar, such a rationale would not be sufficient from a pluralist perspective, un-
less it were accompanied by a strong normative statement as to why the fed-
eral interest must trump.  Such a justification was not a part of the executive 
statement at issue in Medellín.  In addition, a pluralist would not allow any 
automatic supremacy argument to win the day.  This is in contrast to a strand 
of U.S. Supreme Court doctrine that has interpreted the U.S. Constitution to 
contain an implicit foreign affairs preemption doctrine that cuts off the inter-
play of federal and local authority.151  In these cases, the Court has refused to 
allow localities to take actions that were deemed to trench on the exclusive 
national prerogative to conduct foreign affairs.  Yet, as Judith Resnik has 
argued, lost in this approach is the idea that “[n]on-uniformity is a predicate 
of federalist systems, which can impose a national norm but which ought to 
be dedicated to local divergence whenever tolerable.”152  At the very least, 
courts should carefully interrogate the claimed justification for preemption to 
ensure that the local action at issue poses a real, rather than conjectural, threat 
  
 151. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396 (2003) (striking down Cali-
fornia law requiring insurance companies doing business in California to disclose any 
business  activities  in  Europe  during  the  Nazi  Holocaust);  Crosby  v.  Nat’l  Foreign 
Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000) (prohibiting Massachusetts from banning state 
expenditures on imports made with forced labor); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429 
(1968) (striking down Oregon statute that had the effect of preventing a resident of 
East Germany from inheriting property probated in the state).  For a discussion of 
these cases, see Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs, supra note 6. 
 152. Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs, supra note 6, at 86. 
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to the federal government’s conduct.153  After all, given that pluralism is built 
into the structure of federalism, a bare assertion of foreign affairs preemption 
should not win the day, absent further justification.      
V.  CONCLUSION 
Both our international law and our federalism discourse are too often 
trapped in a language of sovereignty that fails to capture the reality of life in 
an era of cross-border interaction.  Indeed, “[a]lthough the color map of  the 
political world displays a neat and ordered pattern of interlocking units (with 
only a few lines of discord), it is not surprising that the real world . . . is one 
of blotches, blends, and blurs.”154  Thus, regardless of the positions one might 
adopt as a matter of political theory, the most important point to remember is 
that a total rejection of foreign, international, or non-state influence and au-
thority is unlikely to be fully successful in a world of global interaction and 
cross-border activity.  Indeed, seen from the point of view of U.S. historical 
practice, “sovereigntists have a dismal track record, in that American law is 
constantly being made and remade through exchanges, some frank and some 
implicit, with normative views from abroad.  Laws, like people, migrate.  
Legal borders, like physical ones, are permeable, and seepage is every-
where.”155 
Accordingly, instead of bemoaning either the “fragmentation” of law156 
or the messiness of jurisdictional overlaps, we should accept them as a     
necessary consequence of the fact that communities cannot be hermetically 
sealed off from each other.  Moreover, we can go further and consider the 
possibility that this jurisdictional messiness might, in the end, provide impor-
tant systemic benefits by fostering dialogue among multiple constituencies, 
authorities, levels of government, and non-state communities.  In addition, 
jurisdictional redundancy allows alternative ports of entry for strategic actors 
who might otherwise be silenced. 
The Medellín case itself demonstrates the value of having multiple over-
lapping fora.  These 52 Mexican nationals, with no recourse in state courts, 
were first able, because of our federalist system, to try pursuing their claims 
  
 153. See id. at  87  (“[J]udges  ought  to  adopt  a  posture  of  non-encroachment by 
insisting on exacting evidence of particular and specific imminent harms before inva-
lidating actions by localities or by states as those entities determine their own expend-
itures of funds and rules.”). 
 154. David H. Kaplan, Territorial Identities and Geographic Scale, in NESTED 
IDENTITIES: NATIONALISM, TERRITORY, AND SCALE 31, 35 (Guntram H. Herb & David 
H. Kaplan eds., 1999). 
 155. Resnik, Foreign as Domestic Affairs, supra note 6, at 63-64. 
 156. See, e.g., U.N.  Int’l  Law Comm’n, Study Group on  Fragmentation  of  Int’l 
Law, Fragmentation of International Law: Difficulties Arising from the                
Diversification and Expansion of International Law, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.682 (2006) 
(finalized by Martti Koskenniemi). 
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in federal courts.  And when that did not work, they were finally able to have 
their story told before the ICJ.  Thus, jurisdictional pluralism is empowering, 
providing opportunities for accessing the levers of law. 
On the other hand, a pluralist perspective does not necessarily privilege 
the international as somehow hierarchically superior and therefore able to 
dictate compliance.  Instead, it recognizes the role of all legal pronounce-
ments as fundamentally rhetorical, and it views the question of legitimacy not 
based on formalisms such as sovereignty but on what statements come to be 
accepted as true over time.  Thus, legitimacy becomes a sociological question 
about changes of legal consciousness, and a pluralist legal system seeks to 
keep those multiple voices in dialogue with each other to the extent possible. 
The Medellín case has now been “decided” by the U.S. Supreme Court, 
and although positivists view such a decision as the “final” word on this dis-
pute, pluralists know that no statement of law, no matter how seemingly au-
thoritative, is ever really final.  Thus, the conversation will go on.  Moreover, 
the Vienna Convention and the ICJ decision will continue to have an impact, 
regardless of the Supreme Court, because local law enforcement authorities 
around the country are now cognizant of their obligations in a way that they 
were not ten years ago.157  Indeed, the U.S. State Department maintains a 
Consular Notification and Outreach Division specifically to help educate 
local prosecutors and police officers of their obligations under the Vienna 
Convention.158  Thus, pluralism recognizes the tangible, day-to-day ways in 
which international law is “brought home,”159 sometimes regardless of offi-
cial legal pronouncements. 
Most fundamentally, all of this interaction is elided or ignored if we 
continue to think and speak in the language of sovereignty, with its purpor-
tedly clear lines of demarcation, its assumed allocation of authority, and its 
formalistic conceptions of legitimacy.  Such a language cannot hope to guide 
us in a world of interdependence, inevitably permeable borders, multiple 
communities, and overlapping jurisdictions.  In the face of this messy world, 
we can retreat and insist on a set of pure theoretical models hopelessly di-
vorced from reality, or we can accept (and perhaps even celebrate) the poten-
tially jurisgenerative and creative role law might play in a plural world order. 
 
  
 157. Levit, supra note 1344, at 41-46. 
 158. See id. at 42-43 (describing the work of the division). 
 159. See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Address, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing 
International Law Home, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 623, 641-42 (1998). 
